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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
requires that a petition for rehearing "shall state with particu-
larity the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the 
court has overlooked or misapprehended. . • ." A federal appeals 
court, considering the same language under Appellate Rule 40, 
said the rule "was not promulgated as a crutch for dilatory coun-
sel . . . nor, in the absence of a demonstrable mistake, to per-
mit reargument of the same matters." United States v. Doe, 455 
F.2d 753, 762 (1st Cir. 1971) (Reh'g denied 1972). 
In the instant case, Respondent Deseret Bank ("the 
Bank") has not demonstrated that this Court overlooked or misap-
prehended any point of fact. At most the Bank makes a plea to 
return to the lower Court to conduct discovery to test whether 
any of its recent speculations may find support. This Court made 
no mistake regarding the facts. 
Nor does the Bank raise a viable point of law with its 
unsupported jurisdictional claim. Even if the Lach Family Part-
nership were unable to bring this suit in its own name, the indi-
vidual partners are plaintiffs in the action and have every right 
to maintain the action. In any event, assumed name statutes such 
as Utah's do not provide a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, 
and any defense under such provisions may be waived and has been 
waived in this case. 
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Another requirement under Rule 35 is: "Counsel for the 
petitioner must certify that the petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay." Counsel for the petitioner has not 
done so in this case and the petition for rehearing should be 
dismissed for that reason. 
ARGUMENT 
RESPONDENT HAS NOT RAISED ANY FACTUAL OR 
LEGAL POINTS WHICH ENTITLE IT TO A REHEARING 
OF THE APPEAL. 
A. Respondent's argument that this Court overlooked 
triable issues of fact is without merit. 
Approximately three months after filing their complaint 
for a declaratory judgment, plaintiffs filed their motion for 
summary judgment supported by the affidavit of David Lach which 
set forth the facts surrounding the transaction. The Bank, in 
response, did not ask for an opportunity to depose Mr. Lach, or 
anyone else, although it clearly would have been entitled to do 
so under Rule 56(f). The Bank did not, as required by Rule 
2.8(e) of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and 
Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, file a memorandum containing 
a statement of material facts which it claimed were in dispute, 
with reference to the portion of the record in question. 
Instead, the bank filed its own motion for summary judgment, 
reinforcing the conclusion that the material facts surrounding 
the transaction were not in dispute. 
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In its petition at p.4, the Bank even now acknowledges 
that "the parties agreed to a statement of facts and both moved 
for summary judgment", correctly indicating that the parties 
agreed to one statement of facts, the facts material to a grant 
of summary judgment for Lach. Before the trial court the Bank 
did not dispute any of those facts, including the fact estab-
lished by the affidavit of David Lach (R. 34) that the Earnest 
Money Agreement, the deed and other sales documents were executed 
on November 28, 1980, a fact the Bank now quarrels with, although 
without the benefit of any conflicting evidence. 
The Bank argues that certain features of the November 
28, 1980 transaction between Lach and the Dewsnups contain 
"discrepancies" which "suggest" that the Assignment of Contract 
and Quitclaim Deed and the Earnest Money Agreement were 
backdated. The Bank's statements are the height of speculation. 
The record of the case contains no evidence whatsoever that the 
dates on those documents are other than indicated. Under the 
1 The Bank ignores the clear language of Rule 56(e): "When the 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allega-
tions or demands of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits 
or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not 
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him." 
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circumstances, the facts as stated in the Lach affidavit must be 
2 
taken as true. 
In a recent review of a summary judgment, the Supreme 
Court of Utah, in Jackson v. Layton City, 66 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 21 
(filed September 23, 1987), rejected an argument that the motion 
was heard before the losing party was able to conduct discovery 
to independently investigate the date a construction project was 
completed, where the same party did not seek a continuance 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). The court stated: 
They ask this Court to reverse the summary 
judgment ruling to allow them to conduct 
discovery of their own. The issue is not 
properly raised. The Jacksons did not seek a 
continuance of the summary judgment proceed-
ings pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) in the 
trial court. The Jacksons do not allege that 
they were precluded from filing a Rule 56(f) 
affidavit. Accordingly, we do not consider 
the argument. Mr. Woodward's affidavit, 
therefore, stands uncontroverted. 
66 Ut. Adv. Rpts. at 22. Here the Bank had every opportunity to 
pursue its factual speculations, including its prerogative under 
U.R.Civ.P. 56(f) to have Lach's motion stayed pending discovery. 
The Bank offered one affidavit in which a Bank officer said 
simply that the Bank had no knowledge of Lach's interest in the 
2 For example, the lack of recording does not disclose any issue 
of material fact. Recording does not assure the veracity of a 
document date. Recording statutes do not exist to protect 
alleged judicial lienholders and are immaterial here. See 
Kartchner v. State Tax Commission, 4 Utah 2d 382, 294 P.2d 790, 
791 (1956) (judgment lien subordinate and inferior to predated 
deed, whether deed recorded after judgment or not recorded at 
all). 
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property. Under Utah law, therefore, the Bank cannot ignore Rule 
56(f) and then claim on appeal that it must conduct discovery. 
The Bank in the instant case is in the same position as 
the losing party in Mastic Tile Division of the Ruberoid Company 
v. Acme Distributing Company. 15 Utah 2d 136, 389 P.2d 56 (1964). 
There the court addressed a plea by a party against whom summary 
judgment vas entered, and who had agreed to the facts in the 
lower court but, on appeal, belatedly and without benefit of the 
record, claimed there were triable issues of fact. The Utah 
Supreme Court said: 
Both sides laid the matter in the lap of the 
court by their mutual motions, and under the 
facts of this particular case, unequivocally 
invited and authorized the court to decide 
the case by interpreting the documents. This 
the court did. Having done so in a case like 
this, where interpretation of the writings 
was the only issue, we do not think the court 
should be required to submit to the subse-
quent urging of the loser that although he 
took his chances without reservation, he must 
have another go at the case. . . . 
389 P.2d at 57. So too, in the present case the Bank unequivo-
cally decided to let the undisputed facts, as presented by Lach, 
stand without reservation. The uncontroverted facts in Lach's 
affidavit show that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
The Bank, as an adversary to Lach's motion for summary 
judgment, was obliged to create a fact issue below to preclude 
summary judgment. Anderson v. American Savings and Loan, 668 
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P.2d 1253r 1254 (Utah 1983). Instead, the Bank has waited until 
after an appeal to raise speculation about facts it agreed were 
undisputed below. Such speculation, without more, does not 
create triable issues of fact. "[S]pecific facts are required to 
show whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Reagan Outdoor 
Advert is inq. Inc. v. Lundaren. 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984). 
Accord Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). The 
application of these principles is evident in Buell Cabinet 
Company v. Sudduth. 608 F.2d 431 (1979), a case cited by the 
Bank, in which the appeals court reversed a grant of summary 
judgment where the opponent "presented materials that could 
support an inference11 regarding the intent of the parties which 
would preclude summary judgment. Buell is readily distinguished 
from the instant case because there the appellant had presented 
3 
evidence which raised a dispute. 
3 Other cases cited by the Bank are not remotely similar to 
the case at bar. See Barnes v. Atlantic and Pacific Life Insur-
ance Company of America, 530 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1976) (federal 
appeals court certified question of law to Alabama State Court 
which held that under Alabama law, one fact question (the reason-
ableness of insurer's delay) remained, which would determine out-
come of case); Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 
390 (Utah 1984) (Utah Supreme Court reversed grant of summary 
judgment where moving affidavit showed "on its face that there is 
a material issue of fact" and therefore movant not entitled to 
judgment as matter of law); F.H. McGraw fc Co. v. New England 
Foundation Co., 210 F.2d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 1954) (case remanded 
for determination of reasonable value while affirming liability 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The Bank's untimely and unsupported conjecture that 
certain facts to which it agreed belov may not be true does not 
justify a rehearing of the appeal. This Court made no mistake 
regarding any point of fact. Accordingly, the Bank's petition 
should be denied. 
B. The nonregistration of an assumed name for the 
Lach Family Partnership, even if it were required under Section 
42-2-10, raises no jurisdictional issue. 
The Bank's argument that the alleged noncompliance with 
Utah Code Ann. S 42-2-10 by the Lach Family Partnership precludes 
this action is without merit. The individual partners are named 
plaintiffs in the case, summary judgment was granted to them, and 
under Utah law, a lawsuit may be brought in the names of individ-
ual partners. Secondly, noncompliance with an assumed name 
statue is not jurisdictional. Since it is not jurisdictional, 
but a matter of abatement, it can be waived and has been waived 
in this action. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
judgment); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Mutual Trucking 
Company, 337 111. App. 140, 85 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1949), (party 
adverse to summary judgment introduced evidence that agent had 
apparent or actual authority to collect premiums); Francis v. 
General Motors Corporation, 287 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1973) 
(cross-motions for summary judgment in negligence case where evi-
dence presented by parties revealed genuine issues of material 
fact). 
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INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS MAT BRING SUIT. 
Any disability of the Lach Family Partnership to 
initiate a lawsuit would not affect the right of the 
plaintiff-partners to bring suit. It is well established under 
Utah law that a partnership may bring suit in the names of the 
partners. Kemp v. Murray. 680 P.2d 758f 759 (Utah 1984); Wall 
Investment Company v. Garden Gate Distributing Incorporated, 593 
P.2d 542f 544 (Utah 1979). See also Gary Energy Corporation v. 
Metro Oil Products, 114 F.R.D. 69 (D. Utah 1987) (partnership 
authorized to bring suit in its own name or in names of part-
ners). Even if the Lach Family Partnership were not able to 
maintain this action, a suit by the individual partners who are 
named plaintiffs is permissible. 
In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court of Utah, 
in Shaw v, Jeppson, 121 Utah 2d 155, 239 P.2d 745 (1952), held: 
Suit by one promisee is permissible although 
the other may be under a disability to sue. 
It seems obvious that one who has a right 
violated, should not be prevented from 
redress merely because another, who may be 
disqualified or unavailable in the suit, may 
share the right. 
239 P.2d at 748. In Shaw, the plaintiff had a licensing agree-
ment with a foreign corporation which had not filed to do busi-
ness in the state. The disqualification of the foreign corpora-
tion did not preclude the plaintiff from enforcing her rights. 
Similarly, in the present case, even if the Lach Family 
Partnership were under a disability with respect to bringing a 
-8-
suit, the individual partners suffer from no such disability. 
The partners are named plaintiffs in the action, summary judgment 
was granted to all of the plaintiffs, and the Bank's untimely 
reliance on the assumed name statute is totally without merit. 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE ASSUMED NAME STATUTE IS 
NOT JURISDICTIONAL. 
The Bank's belated jurisdictional argument based upon 
the assumed name statute is without merit. The Bank argues that 
"Lach Family Partnership" is not presently registered as an 
assumed name and therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction. The 
Bank provides no support for its conclusion that noncompliance 
with the assumed name statute deprives the Court of subject 
4 
matter jurisdiction. 
And, while it appears that the Supreme Court of Utah 
has not addressed whether Utah Code Ann. S 42-2-10 is jurisdic-
tional, other courts reviewing similar or identical provisions 
have held that such provisions merely provide for abatement of an 
action, are not jurisdictional, and may be waived. Section 
42-2-10 states as follows: 
Any person who shall carry on conduct or 
transact any such business under an assumed 
name without having complied with the 
4 Nor does the Bank even attempt to present the information 
regarding nonregistration by way of affidavit. The certificate 
is apparently provided by counsel for the Bank as is the state-
ment ("based upon information and belief") that the Utah Depart-
ment of Business Regulation reports that an assumed name filing 
has not appeared in its records since 1963. 
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provision of this actr shall not sue, prose-
cute, or maintain any action, suit, counter-
claim, cross-complaint, or proceeding in any 
of the courts of this state until the provi-
sions of this chapter have been complied 
with, (Emphasis supplied.) 
The emphasized language in the provision clearly indicates that 
5 
noncompliance is merely a matter of abatement, not jurisdiction. 
Other courts have so held. In Campbell v. Graham, 357 
P.2d 366 (Colo. 1960), the Supreme Court of Colorado, considering 
language similar to the language in the Utah statute, i.e., 
"shall not be permitted to prosecute . . . until such affidavit 
shall be filed," said failure to comply with an assumed name 
statute results in "an abatement of the action" but such a filing 
is not "a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a law-
suit." 357 P.2d at 368. Similarly, in Tyrone v. Kellev. 106 
Cal. Rptr. 761, 507 P.2d 65 (1973), the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia held that a plaintiff's action was not barred by his failure 
to file a certificate of doing business under a fictitious name. 
Such a filing, the court held, "is a mere matter of abatement 
pending the trial, which has the result of suspending the trial 
5 Contrast, for example, the statutory language relating to 
broker licensure in the Oklahoma case cited by the Bank which 
does establish a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit: no person 
•shall bring or maintain an action" • . . without alleging and 
proving that such person "was a licensed real estate broker . . . 
when the alleged cause of action arose." Pointer v. Hill, 536 
P.2d 358, 360 (Okla. 1975). The same court has decided that com-
pliance with an assumed name statute like Utah's is not jurisdic-
tional and may be waived. Horton v. Wachtman Drilling Co.. 385 
P.2d 802, 805 (Okla. 1963) (not necessary for plaintiff to allege 
and prove compliance,therefore defensive only). 
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until the statute is complied with. Tt is not jurisdictional." 
502 P.2d at 73 (emphasis supplied). See also Horton v. Wachtman 
Drilling Co.. 385 P.2d 802, 805 (Okla. 1963) (statute requiring 
filing of assumed name is "matter purely defensive"). 
In the absence of an objection by the defendant, 
therefore, the defense of noncompliance with the assumed name 
statute is waived. See Rivers v. Beadle. 183 Cal. App. 2d 691, 
7 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1960). (By conduct at trial defendants fore-
closed from raising point of noncompliance with fictitious name 
statute). See also Horton, supra, at 805-06 (plaintiff's compli-
ance may be waived by defendant); 59 Am.Jur. 2d, Parties S 18 
("Until a party involved in litigation complies with a fictitious 
name statute or rule, his or her action will be abated until 
compliance is effected; however, compliance may be waived."). 
6 In a Utah case prior to the enactment of S 42-2-10, the 
Supreme Court of Utah held that a defendant may waive its conten-
tion that a plaintiff has failed to comply with the assumed name 
statute. Christensen v. Johnson, 90 Utah 273, 61 P.2d 597 
(1936). Clearly the Utah court has always viewed the statute as 
defensive in nature. 
7 Moreover, many courts that have addressed the issue in a part-
nership context have also held that partnerships which incorpo-
rate the actual surnames of the persons involved are not 
ficticious names for purposes of statutes such as the one in 
question here, gee Miller v. Titeca. 628 P.2d 670 (Mont. 1981); 
Dures Enterprises v. Moore. 9 Ohio App. 3d 99, 458 N.E. 2d 451 
(1983). In the present case, "Lach Family Partnership", the 
partnership name, represents the actual identity of the persons 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Finally, the Bank argues that it is entitled to know 
the real party in interest and that Lach's counsel supposedly 
revealed that Stewart Title Company was the client. In Shaw v. 
Jeppson, supra, the Supreme Court of Utah also explained the 
"real party in interest" rule: 
The reason that the defendant has the right 
to have a cause of action prosecuted by the 
real party in iaterest is so that the judg-
ment will preclude any action on the same 
demand by another and permit the defendant to 
assert all defenses or counterclaims availa-
ble against the real owner of the cause. 
239 P,2d at 748. In the present case, which is a suit for a 
declaratory judgment, any claim by the defendant that an insurer 
will initiate the same suit after the rights of its insured have 
been adjudicated is preposterous. In sum, there is no point of 
law which this court should reconsider with respect to the grant 
of summary judgment to Lach, and the Bank's petition should be 
denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bank cannot point to one disputed fact in the 
record or one undisputed fact that raises any inferences favor-
able to the Bank's position. The record below is clear and the 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
in the partnership, i.e., the Lach family. In addition, because 
the Lach Family Partnership only operated in its own interest and 
did not "transact business" within the meaning of the statutory 
provision, the provision does not apply. However, these argu-
ments are not necessary for a rejection of the Bank's jurisdic-
tion argument. 
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facts in that record demonstrate that Lach is entitled to summary 
judgment under principles of law which the Bank does not dispute. 
The Lach Family Partnership's noncompliance with the 
assumed named statute, if that contention is correct, is not 
jurisdictional. Filing of an affidavit of an assumed name is not 
a jurisdictional prerequisite to a lawsuit. Even if the partner-
ship suffered any disability to maintain the action in its own 
name, the Bank waived any right it might have to raise that 
objection by not raising it below. Most significantly, because 
the individual partners are named as plaintiffs in the case, even 
if failure of the partnership to file an assumed name did present 
a disability, the individual partners are entitled to relief 
under Utah law. For the foregoing reasons, the Bank's Petition 
for Rehearing should be denied and this court's reversal of the 
judgment below should stand. 
DATED this /QJfi day of January, 1988. 
JOHN B. WILSON 
LOIS A. BAAR 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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